In the spring of 2020, a new team (consisting of Galushchenko, Kotin, Hartmut, and Boyaryntsev) was appointed at the National Nuclear Energy Generating Company Energoatom, which is associated with the controversial former deputy Andrii Derkach. A year ago, the frontman of this team, German Galushchenko, was promoted and appointed as the Minister of Energy of Ukraine.
Throughout this time, the work of Ukraine’s nuclear industry complex has been accompanied by constant scandals: sabotage of the construction of a spent nuclear fuel storage facility, manipulations in the electricity market, multimillion losses confirmed by auditors, the actual bankruptcy of the Eastern Mining and Processing Plant company, scandals related to the procurement of parts from Russia, and so on.
Is it betrayal or mere coincidence?
Ukraine’s nuclear energy sector has historically been formed as part of the union’s nuclear-industrial complex and has numerous economic, technological, and professional ties to the State Corporation Rosatom as the legal successor of the USSR Ministry of Medium Machine-Building Industry.
However, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine’s domestic nuclear sector not only became a coveted piece and market for sales but also a competitor in the global markets. That is why Russia, throughout the entire period of Ukrainian independence, has used all levers of influence to prevent Ukraine from getting rid of dependence in this field.
Back in 2006, after the political “pirouette” of Oleksandr Moroz and the formation of a new government led by Viktor Yanukovych, a young and promising leader, a graduate of the Higher School of the KGB, Andrii Derkach, was appointed as the president of the National Nuclear Energy Generating Company Energoatom, representing the quota of the Socialist Party of Ukraine.
Afterwards, the years 2006-2007 were very fruitful in terms of cooperation between the National Nuclear Energy Generating Company Energoatom and the Federal Atomic Energy Agency of the Russian Federation (later reorganized into the State Corporation Rosatom).
An important element of this cooperation was the signing of a long-term contract with Fuel Company TVEL (a subsidiary of the State Corporation Rosatom), based on the “Methodology for Forming Prices for Fresh Nuclear Fuel” for Ukrainian NPPs. This allowed for the calculation of the cost “in accordance with the available trends in the world market of services and materials of the nuclear fuel cycle.” Additionally, cooperation was established between the Russian Atomenergoprom and the State Corporation Ukratomprom.
Thus, Ukrainian nuclear energy became a hostage of Russia’s nuclear-industrial complex for many years, both in terms of nuclear fuel supply and components for nuclear power plant units. As a result, the industry became a source of enrichment for Derkach and his young team, losing any chances for development.
Over a year ago, the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the United States showed interest in the activities of long-standing “shadow leaders” in Ukraine’s nuclear industry and uncovered Derkach’s connections with Russian intelligence services. Requests regarding this matter were sent to Ukraine.
On June 24 of this year, within the framework of the special operation “Rescue of Lieutenant Bakanov,” the Security Service of Ukraine retrieved the “Derkach case” from hiding, dusted it off, and arrested Igor Kolesnikov. He revealed the role of Derkach, which Russians assigned to him on the eve of a military invasion. The Security Service of Ukraine has acted upon some of the materials related to the former deputy’s activities and reported to the public:
https://www.facebook.com/SecurSerUkraine/videos/735490880826702/
Who are these people?
From 2006 to 2008, Mykola Konstantinov worked as Vice President under Derkach, and from 2013 to 2014, he served as the President of the National Nuclear Energy Generating Company Energoatom. Since 2015, he has held official positions within the State Corporation Rosatom (General Director of JSC Rosatom Overseas, General Director of JSC Rosatom Energy International, Deputy General Director of JSC Rosenergoatom).
It was under his recommendation and with the support of the then Minister of Justice of Ukraine, Olena Lukash, that German Galushchenko began his career in the energy sector as the Executive Director for Legal Support of the National Nuclear Energy Generating Company Energoatom.
Some claim that he was concerned about energy issues as early as 2006, assisting Mr Derkach, but there is no documentary evidence to support this. However, there is evidence of multimillion-dollar losses in lawsuits against the National Nuclear Energy Generating Company Energoatom (page 8, No. 47 of the newspaper “Delovaya Stolitsa” dated November 25, 2013), the arrest of all funds and property of Energoatom on the territory of the Russian Federation, the emergence of so-called “intermediaries” within the economic activities of the national nuclear power plant operator with Russian companies — dummy corporations in Georgia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Italy, Austria, Germany, and the Baltic countries, which inflated equipment prices by 50% to 300%.
In 2020, after the appointment of German Galushchenko as Vice President for Prospective Development and Jacob Hartmut as Vice President for Finance of the National Nuclear Energy Generating Company Energoatom, the Representation of Energoatom in the EU (Brussels) was liquidated, and cooperation between the Ukrainian nuclear operator and European institutions was scaled back.
Additionally, work on the completion of Units 3 and 4 of the Khmelnytskyi Nuclear Power Plant with the V-320 reactor from the “Skoda JS” license was terminated. The efforts to organize direct supplies of European products for the needs of the National Nuclear Energy Generating Company Energoatom without intermediaries were halted, as well as the initiatives to further enhance cooperation with Euroatom in improving the safety of operating power units. Lobbying for the Ukrainian “atom” on the European electricity market was also discontinued.
As a result of Galushchenko and Hartmut’s management in the National Nuclear Energy Generating Company Energoatom during 2020-2021, five criminal proceedings
No. 52020000000000618 dated October 2, 2020;
No. 52020000000000729 dated November 17, 2020;
No. 12020100100007741 dated December 25, 2020;
No. 52021000000000006 dated January 5, 2021;
No. 52021000000000012 dated January 12, 2021
were initiated related to the sale of electricity at undervalued prices and misappropriation of funds during procurement, resulting in billions of losses.
The managerial structure of the National Nuclear Energy Generating Company Energoatom continues to be dominated by “Derkach’s people,” who are associated with Russian intelligence services and hold Russian citizenship.
From 2002 to 2019, Oleg Boyaryntsev, the Executive Director of the Personnel Directorate of the National Nuclear Energy Generating Company Energoatom, served as an assistant to Ukrainian Member of Parliament Andrii Derkach and a representative of a candidate for the Verkhovna Rada in the Sumy region. After Galushchenko was appointed as Minister of Energy, acting President Petro Kotin immediately appointed Boyaryntsev as the Executive Director of Personnel, creating a corresponding position with signing authority.
During his tenure at Energoatom, Boyaryntsev actively engaged in personnel reshuffling within the management of physical security, disregarding instructions and labor laws, and assisted in gathering information and conducting shadow operations for his “former boss” Andrii Derkach. Insiders attribute to Boyaryntsev not only control over personnel policy but also involvement in financial and business operations, as well as responsibility for countering the leakage of information unfavorable to the leadership of Energoatom.
On March 24, 2022, Oleg Boyaryntsev was arrested by the Security Service of Ukraine. The Executive Director of Personnel at Energoatom is suspected of direct cooperation with Russian military.
The chief consultant to the President of the National Nuclear Energy Generating Company Energoatom, Petro Kotin, at the South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant was Serhiy Popov (dismissed in January 2022), previously serving as the Executive Director of Quality and Management at Energoatom. He holds Russian citizenship (Russian passport number 4514819284, Tax Identification Number 772412795258). During 2019, Popov received income from Rosenergoatom for the Implementation of Capital Projects (Russia) and from Rosatom Energy International (Russia), totaling approximately 700,000 RUB (5, 600 USD). He systematically made trips to Russia and Belarus.
At the Rivne Nuclear Power Plant, Dmytro Zhyrkov works as a consultant to Petro Kotin. He was born in Yekaterinburg and as of 2011, held a Russian driver’s license number AVE 076969. In 2005, he was the sole owner of immovable property in Moscow, located at 9 Nametkina Street, Building 1, Apartment 212 and/or 213. For a long time until 2019, Zhyrkov was a suspect in a criminal investigation regarding the misappropriation of funds at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, during which he resided on the territory of Russia.
Another “advisor” to Petro Kotin is Igor Myronyuk, who served as an assistant to Member of Parliament Andrii Derkach from 2002 to 2012. He is a close friend and former classmate of Derkach at the Kharkiv Higher Military Command Engineering School (1985-1989). Myronyuk actively visited Russia and Belarus. His son, Myronyuk A.I., works as an employee of the Project Coordination Department for Technical Assistance at Energoatom, and is responsible for the implementation of projects to enhance nuclear power plant safety (project development and procurement of systems and equipment) funded by international donors.
Victor Leleka, a native of Vitebsk, Belarus, serves as the Deputy Director of International Projects at the Directorate of International Cooperation of Energoatom. In 1987, Leleka graduated from the Faculty of Foreign Languages and Foreign Military Information at the Military Institute of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, which trained intelligence officers for subsequent service in the KGB and GRU of the General Staff of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, including deep undercover operations. During 2017-2019, he frequently traveled to Russia and Belarus.
Before the war, Leleka actively worked to strengthen the subordination of Ukrainian nuclear power plants to the Moscow Center of the IAEA and resisted subordination to the Paris Center regarding inspection checks on nuclear facilities in Ukraine. Until February 24, 2022, during the interactions with the leadership of the Paris Center of the IAEA, Leleka advocated for the reinstatement of inspections of Ukrainian nuclear power plants by the Moscow Center of the IAEA.
See also: Words and actions of Rafael Grossi. Whom does the Director General of the IAEA serve?
Iryna Otrash, the scandalous head of the Pechersk District Court of Kyiv from 2007 to 2014, after being promoted to the position of advisor to the President of Energoatom, was supposed to be appointed as the Director of the Executive Directorate for Legal Support at Energoatom in January 2022. This would have provided her with access to all confidential documents and contracts of Energoatom since they are all approved by the said Directorate.
Otrash holds Russian citizenship (Russian passport number 9714097358, Tax Identification Number 910512078385), as confirmed by the data from the Federal Tax Service of Russia.
During 2014-2019, she was present in the occupied Crimea. It has been established that on June 27, 2019, Otrash arrived from the occupied Crimea through the Kalanchak checkpoint using her Ukrainian passport.
As you can see, there are no “random” individuals in the leadership of Energoatom.
So why, with such factual evidence against the “Derkach team,” do they still manage to “torment” the nuclear industry?
Clearly, the comfortable life of the Derkach team was ensured by its “own” people in law enforcement agencies. That’s why most of the cases opened in previous years were simply “dragged out.”
And this is confirmed by the arrest on July 16, 2022, of an employee of the Security Service, Oleg Kulinich, who was recently the head of the Security Service department in Crimea and is suspected of cooperation with Russian special services.
During Viktor Yanukovych’s premiership in 2006-2007, Oleg Kulinich served as the Vice President of Energoatom. It was during the same period that Andrii Derkach headed Energoatom. Kulinich is also a graduate of the Russian FSB Academy.
The accumulation of such facts and the presence of a significant number of traitors within state structures have ultimately undermined the credibility of the head of the Security Service of Ukraine. Ivan Bakanov was dismissed on July 19, 2022.
However, society awaits answers to the following questions:
Can the information about the meeting of Russians at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (in the person of the acting director and deputy director of physical protection) with the words “welcome to the new station of Rosatom” be confirmed?
Is there ongoing work to denounce the interstate (not interdepartmental) agreements between the Russian Federation and Ukraine regarding nuclear matters?
How exactly did the technical documentation for “Westinghouse” fuel end up with Russians? Who is responsible for this?
Construction of the Centralized Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Facility. The initial estimated cost of constructing the storage facility was around 650 million UAH (17,8 million USD). The corresponding tenders were canceled twice. On December 9, 2022, a contract worth almost 2 billion UAH (54 million USD)was signed with the firm KBR for the completion of the project, without a tender. At the same time, there are videos circulating online where a person resembling Bozhko says that “everything was stolen,” referring to the construction of the Centralized Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Facility. Are law enforcement agencies conducting relevant investigations? What is the progress of the cases regarding the completion of the storage facility? When is the planned date to start transporting fuel there?
What is happening at the Eastern Mining and Processing Plant? Have the liquid assets been transferred to Energoatom? Is the Minister considering transferring the “illiquid” assets to the State Enterprise Barier (formerly Prydniprovsky Chemical Plant radioactive dumps)?
The change of director at Rivne Nuclear Power Plant (RNPP), Pavlishin. What was it all about? And what does his son have to do with it? They say that after his transfer, he had meetings at the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine. He shared some interesting information.
What happened to the turbine of the second unit at Khmelnytskyi Nuclear Power Plant? Who is responsible for it? What is the status of the repairs? Overall, what is the progress of the repair work at the nuclear power plants? Are we prepared for winter?
Energoatom and the trade union have signed a joint decision for the collective agreement, according to which the management retains a full bonus of 100%, while the staff receives 40% and 50% respectively. Is this true? Why is it so?
Does Energoatom have a strategy until 2050? How will the construction of new 9 (or 14) nuclear power units, with a cost of 6-7 billion dollars each, be financed? Where will the generated power be directed? How does this fit into Ukraine’s energy balance?
The answers to these questions are actually known, and we will discuss them in upcoming publications.
Originally posted by Victor Kurtev on Hvylya. Translated and edited by the UaPosition – Ukrainian news and analytics website
