Non-Ukrainian politicians and analysts who deal with Russia and Ukraine widely recognize the motives behind the full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022, as destructive and genocidal. Therefore, they agree that Kyiv should liberate as much of mainland Ukraine (or even the entire territory) as possible through both military and non-military means. In contrast, they often accept the annexation of Crimea by Moscow nine years ago as a fait accompli. Sometimes, they make such statements due to Vladimir Putin’s high level of personal involvement in what he views as the expansion of Russian territory in 2014. At times, the Kremlin raises the question of the importance of Crimea and its largest city, Sevastopol, for the entire region or the alleged fundamental role they played in Russian history.
The geostrategic importance of the Crimean Peninsula is seen by some observers as a reason to support the idea of returning this part of the territory to Ukraine. If Moscow continued to control Crimea, it would have far-reaching consequences not only for Ukrainian geopolitics, stability, and trade routes. It would also be dangerous for other Black Sea countries as well as for NATO and the European Union, which include some coastal states.
The concerns that further occupation of Crimea would allow the Kremlin to turn the Black Sea into a Russian lake, as it has already done with the Azov Sea, are not unfounded. The conflict of interests in the Black Sea between Russia, on one side, and Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, or Turkey, not to mention Ukraine itself, is evident. It has significant potential for the future escalation of tensions in the region, making a compelling argument in favor of the swift return of Crimea to Ukraine.
However, this line of reasoning also works in the opposite direction. The increased security and control that Kyiv will gain in the Black Sea after the peninsula’s liberation will be seen as a reduction of Moscow’s influence. In this zero-sum game, the greater the geostrategic gain for Ukraine, the greater the losses for Russia. Therefore, the broader security and political significance of Crimea are important but also complex arguments for supporters of Ukraine. So-called realists may flip it, arguing that the geostrategic importance of Crimea itself is such a serious challenge that this argument should be dismissed.
Shortsightedness of pragmatists
The exclusion of the return of the Crimean Peninsula under Kyiv’s control from the consideration of scenarios for ending the Russian-Ukrainian war is often presented in this context as pragmatic. At first glance, it may indeed seem like a reasonable plan of action and the setting of achievable goals. However, such thinking ignores important geographical, economic, and political realities of Crimea’s past, present, and future.
This approach mistakenly interprets or distorts the key sources and dynamics of escalation in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in 2022 and earlier. Moscow’s seizure of territories in southeastern Ukraine last year was motivated not only by global objectives of destroying the Ukrainian state and people and establishing political control over the entire country. It also aimed to support the Russian annexation of Crimea, which took place eight years earlier.
Unlike the recent illegal expansion of Russian territorial control in southern Ukraine, the annexation of the peninsula by Moscow in 2014 was enthusiastically supported by the majority of Russians. Even today, it is highly valued by Russian citizens and elites. The occupation of Crimea remains a source of legitimacy and popularity for Putin’s regime.
However, the initial Russian annexation was incomplete, costly, and risky. It added an illegal enclave far from the main Russian territories to the Russian state. In terms of ensuring the economic and geopolitical viability of the occupied Crimea, the proper incorporation of the peninsula into the illegally expanded Russia was only completed in 2022.
In this context, the strategic division of Western policy towards Moscow between ending Russia’s occupation of mainland Ukraine, on the one hand, and postponing the reversal of Russia’s annexation of Ukrainian Crimea, on the other, is misguided. Hypothetically, Russia’s occupation of the peninsula could continue after Ukraine’s territorial integrity is partially restored on the mainland. However, such a scenario, popular in the West, would not only be unsatisfactory for Kyiv. It would also pose a strategic challenge to Moscow in at least four ways.
Freshwater problem
Firstly, from 2014 to 2022, the economy of the occupied Crimea faced a growing water deficit. Water resources on the peninsula have always been limited. This problem was resolved in the late 20th century and after the dissolution of the USSR when the North Crimean Canal supplied fresh water from the Dnipro River through southern Ukrainian territories to the peninsula via the Perekop Isthmus.
When Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, Ukraine blocked the operation of the North Crimean Canal. As a result, the Russian occupation administration increasingly depleted the meager local freshwater resources of the peninsula, disrupting its ecological balance necessary to support the economy and infrastructure, including military facilities.
Unlike the 1960s when the North Crimean Canal was constructed, there are now numerous technologies for industrial desalination of seawater. However, since the occupation of the peninsula, Moscow has not built any desalination plants in Crimea nor laid any pipelines to supply fresh water from southern Russia. The growing water deficit and the Kremlin’s inaction in this matter indicated its strategy: with each passing year, the likelihood of a war over the control of the North Crimean Canal became increasingly probable. In the spring of 2022, Moscow temporarily resolved the issue by seizing and restoring the operation of the canal.
Partial restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity while leaving Crimea under Moscow’s control would lead to the second permanent closure of the canal by Kyiv. From a political standpoint, it cannot be expected that Ukraine would endorse the ongoing Russian occupation of its territory. Additionally, according to international law, Kyiv cannot support an illegal annexation by supplying water. Therefore, the liberation of mainland Ukraine but not Crimea would mean a return to the status quo of 2014-2022 for Russia. This scenario poses a significant challenge for the future Russian annexation of the peninsula, a challenge that both Moscow and Kyiv fully understand.
The absence of a land connection
The second challenge that the occupied Crimea faced between 2014 and 2022 was the lack of a land corridor to Russia. The rapid construction and opening of the Kerch Strait Bridge in 2019 partially addressed this issue. It put an end to Russia’s reliance on complex ferry shipments from the ports of the Krasnodar Krai to the Kerch Peninsula in Crimea.
However, the transportation viaduct across the Kerch Strait did not fully resolve the main economic problem of the Crimea occupied by Russia. Russian institutions, companies, and citizens were unable to utilize the southern regions of Ukraine for the transportation of goods and people until recently. The economic development of the peninsula was limited. The use of the Kerch Strait Bridge still meant an expensive and lengthy detour for transit between central Russia and Crimea. The destruction of the bridge by Ukraine in October 2022 further highlighted the fragility of this transportation route.
Only the armed occupation of southeastern Ukraine in 2022 theoretically allowed Moscow to address this issue. The Russian annexation of Ukrainian regions — Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson — was primarily motivated by “irrational” irredentism. It undermined the sovereignty and statehood of Ukraine, with the ultimate goal of gaining control over the central political power in Kyiv. It was also motivated by “rational” considerations regarding the current and future needs of the occupied Crimea. So far, the new land corridor through southeastern Ukraine had limited use for Russia due to its proximity to the front line. However, the annexation in 2022 opened up opportunities for Moscow to better address various development, defense, and logistical challenges of the occupied peninsula.
Geopolitical blind spot
The third problem of the Russian occupation of Crimea is its overall undefined status in the context of regional and political security issues. Crimea is located far from the center of Russia; geographically and historically, it belongs to the southern part of Ukraine. Contrary to popular non-Ukrainian public opinion, the peninsula has been administratively linked to Ukrainian territories to the north for most of its history. This was the case during the Crimean Khanate (until 1783), the Russian Empire (1802-1917), the Soviet Union (1954-1991), and the independent Ukrainian state (1991-2014).
Before Catherine II’s conquest of Crimea in 1783, the territory of modern mainland Ukraine to the north of the peninsula was also part of the Crimean Khanate. In the subsequent period of the Russian Empire, Crimea became part of the Taurida Governorate of the Romanov Empire. This large administrative district encompassed a significant portion of modern southern Ukraine, including the peninsula, southern Ukrainian lands, and a major part of the Black Sea coastline. However, the territory of the modern Russian Federation was not included in this district.
During most of the Soviet period, Crimea belonged to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR). It was only from 1922 to 1954 that it formally became part of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) within the Soviet Union. Shortly after Stalin’s death in 1953, the peninsula was transferred from the RSFSR to the Ukrainian SSR by unanimous decision of the then-collective leadership of the USSR.
The sudden transfer was not a whim of Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev as it is sometimes claimed. In reality, his power as the newly appointed First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee was not yet consolidated at the time. The reunification of Crimea with Ukrainian territories in 1954 was driven by administrative rationality, economic calculation, straightforward geographical facts, and logistical needs for the post-war economic development of Crimea.
See also: Elimination of the autonomy of Crimea: a provocation or a timely discussion?
As a result, the Soviet period, contrary to common belief abroad — actually strengthened the commercial, social, and cultural connections between the peninsula and the mainland Ukrainian territories. After Ukraine gained independence, the peninsula became the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Although separatism was present on the peninsula in the 1990s, the region experienced peaceful development, particularly when compared to the large-scale violence in neighboring former Yugoslavia, Moldova, Chechnya, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. The non-Ukrainian ethnic population of Crimea — Russians, Crimean Tatars, and other minorities — became an integral part of post-Soviet Ukrainian society and the political nation.
In 2014, the Kremlin attempted to counter these fundamental natural and historical conditions of Crimea’s existence within Ukraine through its annexation, but it could not invalidate them then, nor can it do so now. By occupying the peninsula, Russia acted against certain fundamental geographic, political, economic, and cultural facts that not only shaped Crimea’s past but still exist and will determine its future.
The problem of long-term isolation
The fourth problem of Russian-occupied Crimea lies in the fact that not only the annexation itself but also its international consequences have intensified the economic and political vulnerability of the peninsula. Currently, the peninsula faces harsh sanctions and international isolation. Since 2014, it has been cut off from external trade and investments, almost all non-Russian tourism, as well as global cultural and scientific exchanges.
Not recognized as Russian territory by the majority of countries worldwide, Crimea remains legally Ukrainian land regardless of who politically controls it. It has not lost its distinct status as an occupied region, which is not inherently Russian. In this state, over the past nine years, the political, social, and cultural life on the peninsula has become increasingly oppressive and repressive, even compared to Russia itself.
From the end of February 2014 to the end of February 2022, Crimea existed as a politically ambiguous territory between the Russian Federation and mainland Ukraine. The portions of Ukraine’s Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions occupied in 2022 have still not been able to establish a reliable transportation corridor or a strong connection between Russia and Crimea. The war continues to rage in the recently annexed territories of Ukraine by Russia.
By the end of spring 2023, it became evident that the Kremlin’s plan for a strong connection between Crimea and Russia through annexation would never materialize. Even in the unlikely scenario where Moscow continues to control the southeastern part of Ukraine, the level of uncertainty regarding Crimea’s geopolitical status will persist. Once Ukraine regains the territories north of the occupied peninsula by military or other means, the fragility of Crimea’s isolated strategic position will increase, becoming even more politically significant. The Kremlin will return to its initial position in its efforts to integrate the annexed peninsula.
All or nothing
From Kyiv’s perspective, the imperatives are clear. Maintaining Russian military presence in Crimea will remain a significant military threat to mainland Ukraine and severely complicate the defense of other non-Russian areas in the Black Sea region. Moscow can effectively cut them off, employing A2/AD tactics (anti-access/area denial — focused on suppressing enemy activity in a specific area and denying external forces access to it). The fate of the peninsula is a key issue for any efforts aimed at reducing future Russian military threats not only to Ukraine but to the entire Black Sea region.
Therefore, the popular strategy of separating the goal of liberating the currently occupied mainland territories from the goal of regaining control over Crimea by Kyiv is not a path to long-term security and stability. It will not only be highly unsatisfactory for the majority of Ukrainians but also simply return Moscow to a complicated situation in annexed Crimea, which was one of the reasons for the invasion in 2022. Integrating the occupied peninsula into the Russian state and economy would once again become a costly and uncertain affair for the Kremlin, even more so than it is today.
The recent annexation of Ukrainian territory has put Moscow in an inflexible geopolitical position. Sooner or later, it will need a ceasefire and, ultimately, a stable peace for economic reasons, if not more. However, the current Russian national mythology includes Crimea as part of the imagined core territory of the Russian nation. Its significance within this mythology is too great for the Kremlin to agree to return the peninsula under Kyiv’s jurisdiction.
As a result, for the Kremlin, the Crimean issue represents an all-or-nothing situation regarding its territorial acquisitions between 2014 and 2022. The peninsula is necessary for the Kremlin to maintain the legitimacy and popularity of its regime. However, the occupied Crimea, in turn, needs Ukrainian territory to its north to become self-sufficient and integrated into Russia as a region.
See also: Aksyonov’s private armies. How Russian-occupied Crimea is preparing for a Ukrainian counteroffensive
Therefore, Kyiv can only hope for the liberation of the occupied lands together with the peninsula through armed liberation or strong military and economic pressure on Russian troops stationed in isolated Crimea. The West must support Kyiv in achieving this goal by all possible means, including long-range missiles and fighter jets.
Kakhovka
On June 6th, Russian occupation forces destroyed the Kakhovka dam on the Dnipro River. The resulting flood had devastating consequences for the southeastern part of Ukraine. This act violated the protocol attached to the 1977 Geneva Convention, which prohibits the destruction of dams for military purposes due to the high risk of harm to the civilian population.
The depletion of the Kakhovka reservoir also means that the North Crimean Canal, which had been partially operational, is once again unusable. This outcome of the Russian terrorist act in Kakhovka seems to indicate the limited importance of Russian control over Ukrainian territories north of Crimea for further illegal occupation of the peninsula by Moscow.
However, the Crimean goal of a full-scale Russian invasion in 2022 was only one of several factors, perhaps not the most important, in the escalation. This goal was and remains part of the Kremlin’s intentions to subjugate the entire Ukraine. Moreover, the rationality and consistency of Russian military strategy and decision-making should not be overestimated. Sometimes, the left hand may not know what the right hand is doing.
By the beginning of summer 2023, the decommissioning of the North Crimean Canal could have also been driven by new Russian political calculations. Moscow may have concluded that Crimea is indefensible and that isolating the occupied peninsula cannot be prevented if the Ukrainian counteroffensive is successful. In such a case, the Kremlin might have been interested in preventing the return of a functioning North Crimean Canal to Ukraine, as it could serve as an argument for the population of Crimea and the international community regarding the reestablishment of Ukrainian control over the peninsula.
With the loss of the ability to supply a significant amount of fresh water to Crimea in the near future, both Moscow and Kyiv will face increasing infrastructure problems. While the peninsula remains under Russian occupation, the Kremlin will bear responsibility for the lack of sufficient water supply. However, once Crimea is liberated by Kyiv, this burden will fall on its shoulders. Considering this perspective, Moscow’s decision to prevent future water flow from the Dnipro River to Crimea through the canal can be interpreted as supporting the argument about the importance of the southeastern region of Ukraine for the peninsula.
Third countries, primarily those in the Black Sea region, and international organizations that wish to assist Ukraine should already consider possible ways to address or at least mitigate the growing issue of freshwater in Crimea. These considerations and preparations could involve measures for the restoration, at least partially, of the North Crimean Canal’s functionality, the rapid construction of desalination plants in Crimea, or exploring the possibility of water transportation to the peninsula through pipelines or by sea. The most rational solution may involve equipping Crimea with multiple desalination plants and the necessary energy infrastructure. Ultimately, this could make the freshwater supply on the peninsula permanently independent of external sources.
Originally posted by Andreas Umland on Zaxid.net. Translated and edited by the UaPosition – Ukrainian news and analytics website
See also: Blowing up the Kakhovka Dam: Russia’s announced crime
